Wayne Pearce v. Martin J. Wistisen and Richard Oveson : Brief of Respondents by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1982
Wayne Pearce v. Martin J. Wistisen and Richard
Oveson : Brief of Respondents
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Jackson Howard and D. David Lambert; Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant;
Darwin C. Hansen; Hansen & Spratley; Attorney for Defendants-Respondents;
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Pearce v. Wistisen, No. 18376 (Utah Supreme Court, 1982).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/3088
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
WAYNE PEARCE, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
MARTIN J. WISTISEN and 
RICHARD OVESON, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
• . 
. 
. 
• . 
• . 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
-. 
. 
. 
• . 
. 
• 
Case No. 18,376 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE FOURTH 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR UTAH 
COUNTY, HONORABLE ALLEN B. SORENSON PRESIDING 
JACKSON HOWARD and 
D. DAVID LAMBERT, For: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
120 East 300 North 
P.O. Box 778 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Attorneys for 
Plaintiff-Appellant 
DARWIN C. HANSEN, FOR: 
HANSEN, CRIST & SPRATLEY 
110 West Center Street 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Attorneys for 
Defendants-Respondents 
F!L D 
AUG l 5 1982 
____ _. ....... -- ---·---. -------wf9Cll 
..-·--·gi•~--- ... Cler~ Supreme Court. Uta~1 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
WAYNE PEARCE, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
MARTIN J. WISTISEN and 
RICHARD OVESON, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
• . 
• . 
• . 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
Case No. 18,376 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE FOURTH 
· JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR UTAH 
COUNTY, HONORABLE ALLEN B. SORENSON PRESIDING 
JACKSON HOWARD and 
D. DAVID LAMBERT, For: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
120 East 300 North 
P.O. Box 778 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Attorneys for 
Plaintiff-Appellant 
DARWIN C. HANSEN, FOR: 
HANSEN, CRIST & SPRATLEY 
110 West Center Street 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Attorneys for 
Defendants-Respondents 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .••••.•..............•............... iii 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 5 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT ...••.........•............ 5 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL ...................•..........•... 6 
STATEMENT OF FACTS . . • . . . . . . . . . . • . . . • . • . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 
ARGUMENT 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 9 
POINT I 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO GIVE APPELLANT'S 
REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NUMBER SIX..................... 9 
POINT II 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO GIVE APPELLANT'S 
REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NUMBER THIRTEEN CONCERNING THE 
PRESUMPTION THAT A DECEASED WOULD EXERCISE DUE CARE 
FOR HIS OWN SAFETY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 
POINT III 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR REGARDING ITS INSTRUCTIONS 
CONCERNING THE REQUIREMENT OF AN ANCHOR ABOARD THE 
BOAT................................................. 16 
POINT IV 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ALLOWING TESTIMONY THAT THE 
DECEDENT CONSUMED ALCOHOL DURING THE NIGHT AND 
MORNING PRECEDING HIS DEATH.......................... 20 
CONCLUSION . . • . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . • . . . 27 
-ii-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES CITED: 
Bach v Penn Central Transportation Co., 
502 F.2d 1117 (6th Cir. 1974) 
Bambrough v Bethers, 552 P.2d 1286 (Utah 1976) 
DeMille v Erickson, 23 Utah 2d 278, 462 P.2d 
159, (1969) 
In re Richard's Estate, 5 Utah 2d 106, 297 P.2d 
542 (1956) 
Martin v Safeway Stores, Inc., 565 P.2d 1139, 
(Utah 1977) 
Mecham v Allen, 1 Utah 2d 79, 262 P.2d 285 (1953) 
Ortega v Thomas, 14 Utah 2d 296, 283 P.2d 406 (1963) 
Poulin v Zurtman, 542 P.2d 251, (Alaska 1975) 
State vs. Ouzounian, 26 Utah 2d 442, 491 P.2d 1093 
(1971) 
Walters v Querry, 626 P.2d 455 (Utah 1981) 
iii 
Page 
23,24,26 
21 
15 
9 
24 
14,15 
10 
22 
9 
12,13 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
STATUTES AND MISCELLANEOUS AUTHORITY: 
Utah Code Annotated, §73-18-8 
4 Utah Admin. R. §A60-01-3 (3) (b) (12) (1975) 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 61 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 4 
iv 
Page 
16 
16 
9,20 
21,24 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
. 
WAYNE PEARCE, 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
• . 
• . 
Plaintiff-Appellant, • . 
vs. 
MARTIN J. WISTISEN and 
RICHARD OVESON, 
• . 
. 
. 
. 
. 
• . 
• . 
• . 
Defendants-Respondents. . . 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 18,376 
Appellant Wayne Pearce brought a wrongful death action 
against Respondents for damages arising out of his son's death 
from drowning during a boating excursion on Utah Lake. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case was tried by jury, The Honorable Allen B. 
Sorenson, Judge, presiding, on the 7th, 8th, 9th and 10th days of 
December, 1981. The jury returned the verdict of "no cause of 
action" and on December 23, 1~81, the Court entered its judgment 
accordingly. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondents' request that the verdict and judgment be 
affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant Wayne Pearce is the father of Evan Pearce, 
deceased, who was age eighteen when he drowned in Utah Lake 
sometime after 7:00 p.m., June 1, 1979 and before 5:00 a.m., June 
2, 1979. 
On May 31, 1979, Evan was a senior at Timpview High School 
in Provo, Utah. He left for school in the morning so as to 
arrive at the regular time of 8: 00 a.m. (R. 381). He met Rod 
Hunt, who was his friend (R. 543), and they spent much of the day 
organizing and preparing for a graduation party which they had 
planned for later that night following the graduation ceremonies 
(R. 544). The party was to be held up Provo Canyon (R. 545) . 
After the graduation ceremony, the boys went up the canyon 
for the party arriving about 9:00 p.m. (R. 546). Approximately 
two hundred of their fellow students attended the party where 
alcoholic beverages were available. Both Evan and Rod 
participated in drinking (R. 54 7) . Kevin Wistisen, then age 
seventeen (R. 404), who is the son of Martin J. Wistisen, one of 
the Respondents, arrived later during the night. 
Most of the students left the party about 3:00 a.m. June 
1, 1979. However, Evan, Rod and Kevin, together with fifteen or 
so other students remained until about 9: 00 a.m. during which 
time additional achololic beverages were consumed by all (R. 
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548) . 
548) • 
Evan had about one hour of sleep during the night (R. 
At about 9:00 a.m. on June 1, 1979, Evan Pearce, Rod Hunt 
and Kevin Wistisen left the canyon and returned to their homes in 
Provo (R. 548). On the way down the canyon, the boys discussed 
the possibility of going water skiing on Utah Lake (R. 550) . 
Kevin was to get permission from his father to use the family 
Glastron 16~ foot boat which was jointly owned by Richard Oveson, 
the other Respondent (R. 301). Permission was given (R. 318). 
Rod decided he did not want to go water skiing with his two 
~ompanions (R. 551). 
Kevin and Evan made arrangements for two girls to go with 
them. One was Leslie Pearce, Evan's sister, and the other was 
Angela Adams (R. 331,359,406). 
Kevin picked up his friends and all arrived at the Provo 
boat harbor about 5:30 p.rn. The group decided to go to the west 
side of the lake directly across from the harbor because they 
felt conditions for.skiing would be better there (R. 416). 
Around 6:30 p.rn., Kevin suggested that they return to the 
harbor (R. 417). All agreed, but Evan insisted on skiing again 
(R. 417). He bet each of the two girls that he could ski all the 
way back to the harbor (R. 345,365). 
Evan was skiing as the boat started back for the harbor; 
he fell; Kevin turned the boat to retrieve him; upon reaching 
Evan he told Kevin he was tired and wanted to rest, 
notwithstanding he insisted on skiing again and pushed away from 
the boat; in the meantime the boat had floated over the ski rope 
-3-
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and when Kevin placed the outdrive in gear, the rope became 
entangled (R. 417-423). 
Kevin tried to untangle the rope from inside the boat; he 
could not, so he put on a life preserver and got into the water 
after disconnecting the electrical power to the engine and 
outdrive. Kevin was concerned for Evan in that the boat was 
drifting away from Evan due to the wind. He therefore told the 
girls to watch Evan (R. 424-425). 
Evan, in the meantime, had removed his life jacket and 
began swimming toward the boat abandoning the jacket and skis in 
the water. The girls told Kevin. He then swam toward Evan while 
holding onto the ski rope in a effort to assist Evan. When Evan 
reached the end of the rope, it broke. Evan tried swimming back 
to the boat, but could not because the wind was blowing it too 
fast. Kevin then returned to Evan and held him above the surface 
of the water. At the time, Evan was exhausted. Kevin called to 
the girls to throw out another life preserver, which they did. 
The boys made their way to the extra life preserver. Evan put it 
on but did not adjust it for fit. He therefore was unable to zip 
it up. The boys then began swimming to the west shore because it 
appeared closest. Evan swam faster than Kevin causing the boys 
to separate . Kev in made it to the west shore arriving about 
midnight, Evan did not. Sometime after the boys separated, Evan 
drowned (R. 425-428). 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO GIVE 
APPELLANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NUMBER 
SIX. 
A. Legal standard for deciding whether Trial Court 
committed error in not giving a requested instruction: 
The Utah Supreme Court in State vs. Ouzounian, 26 Utah 2d 
442, 491 P.2d 1093(1971) stated the applicable standard in 
deciding whether error had been committed in not giving a 
requested instruction, as follows: 
"A refusal to give an instruction cannot be the 
basis for reversal, unless the jury was 
insufficiently advised of the issue they were to 
determine, or it appears that they were confused 
or misled to the prejudice of the person 
complaining." 491 P.2d @ page 1095 (emphasis 
added) 
See also In re Richard's Estate, 5 Utah 2d 106, 297 P.2d 
542 (1956). 
Even if one were to find error had occurred in the 
failure to give a requested instruction, there may be no 
basis for refusal if the alleged error were harmless. Rule 
61, Utah Rules of Civil Prcedure, provides: 
"No error. . . is grounds for . . . disturbing a 
judgment, ••. unless refusal to take such action 
appears. . .inconsistant with substantial 
justice. The court at every stage of the 
proceeding must disregard any error or defect in 
the proceedings which does not affect the 
substantial rights of the parties." (emphasis 
added) 
-5-
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In Ortega v Thomas, 14 Utah 2d 296, 283 P.2d 406(1963), 
the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
"It is necessary to keep in mind that it is the 
policy of our law that.there shall be no reversal 
of a judgment merely because of error. This 
firmly established principle is reflected in Rule 
61, U.R.C.P. and in our decisional law. In order 
to justify reversal the appellant must show error 
that was substantial and prejudicial in the sense 
there is at least a reasonable likelihood that in 
the absence of the error the result would have 
been different." 383 P.2d@ page 408 (emphasis 
added) 
B. Failure of the Trial Court to give Appellant's 
requested Instruction Number Six was not error: 
Appellant claims error in the Court' s failure to 
give his requested Instruction Number Six (R. 118) upon 
grounds that it denied him the right to have his theory of 
the case (vicarious liability) considered by the jury. His 
claim is only meritorious if such failure insufficiently 
advised the Jury of the issue it was to determine or 
confused or misled the jury to Plaintiff's prejudice. 
The Court's Instruction Number Five (R. 178) clearly 
defined the issue for the jury to decide: 
"In this case the Plaintiff has the burden of 
pursuading you that the Defendants Martin J. 
Wistisen and/ or Richard Oveson and/ or the boat 
operator Kevin Wistisen was negligent and that 
such negligence was a proximate cause of the 
death of Evan Pearce." 
The instruction advises the jury that the negligence 
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of both boat owners and its operator was in question and 
that Appellant had the burden of proving it. 
The Court's Instruction Number Six (R. 179) 
prescribes the standard the jury was to apply in deciding 
the negligence of each: 
"It is the duty of owners and operators of boats, 
such as the one here involved, to have that boat 
equipped with all safety appliances and devices 
that a reasonable prudent person conversant with 
boating and water skiing would have for the 
protection of the life and safety of users of the 
boat, including a water skier, anticipating 
possible foreseeable emergencies." (emphasis 
added) 
The special verdict given by the Court (R. 193,194) 
incorporates Instructions Five and Six in Question One as 
follows: 
"1. Were the Defendants Martin J. Wistisen and 
Richard Oveson, or either 'of them, and Kevin 
Wistisen negligent at the time of the occurrence 
in question?" (emphasis added) 
ANSWER: 
(yes or no) 
Since the instructions given by the Court, and also the 
Special Verdict made reference to both the owners of the boat and 
its operator, and in most cases by their respective names, it 
seems abundantly clear that the jury received instructions 
advising them that the issue of negligence involved all three. 
Question One of the Special Verdict asked for a finding of 
negligence as to all three and Question Five of the Special 
-7-
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Verdict asked for a total percentage of negligence as to all 
three. 
Appellant's Complaint that the term "vicarious liability" 
was not specifically defined or used in the Court's instructions 
is one of form only and not substance. Vicarious liability as 
applied in this case simply means that the negligence of the 
operator of the boat is added to the negligence of its owner or 
owners in determining the total liability of the owners. · The 
Court's instructions as drawn and given implicitly made that 
addition and thus Plaintiff had his theory of vicarious liability 
considered by the jury though the term was not specifically 
defined. 
It appears to Respondents that the Court's instructions 
were more clear and less confusing than had the Court attempted 
to explain the legal term of vicarious liability and then 
instructed the jury as to its application as ·requested by 
Appellant in his requested Instruction Number Six. 
As stated in Walters v Querry, 626 P.2d 455 (Utah 1981): 
"Nevertheless, . the Court cannot be said to have 
failed to properly instruct the jury when 
requested instructions are fully covered in other 
instructions given." 626 P.2d @ pages 458, 459 
C. Even if the Trial Court committed error in not 
giving Appellant's requested Instruction Number Six, it was 
harmless and does not constitute ground for reversal: 
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The jury specifically found Martin J. Wistisen and 
Richard Oveson, the owner of the boat, and Kevin Wistisen, 
its operator, negligent at the time of the occurance. 
Therefore, Appellant received the finding of negligence 
which he sought notwithstanding his allegation of error. 
Again, as stated in Walters v Querry, 626 P.2d 455 (Utah 
1981); 
"These instructions relate specifically to the 
negligent character of Defendants conduct. The 
jury specifically found in Plaintiff's favor on 
this issue. The dismissal was based on causation 
alone, and therefore, no flaw in the Court's 
instruction relating to negligence can inure to 
Plaintiff's benefit." 626 P.2d @ page 459 
(emphasis added) 
In the instant case, the matter was also decided on the 
issue of causation and thus Appellant's claim is not grounds for 
reversal. 
POINT II 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO GIVE 
APPELLANT'S REQUESTD INSTRUCTION NUMBER 
THIRTEEN CONCERNING THE PRESUMPTION THAT A 
DECEASED WOULD EXERCISE DUE CARE FOR HIS 
OWN SAFETY. 
Respondents have no argument with the general rule of law 
that man's natural instinct for self-preservation gives rise to a 
presumption that one will normally avoid harm to himself which 
otherwise could cause death. However, Respondents disagree with 
Appellants concerning its application in the instant case. 
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A. Legal standard for giving instruction concerning the 
presumption: 
In Mecham v Allen, 1 Utah 2d 79, 262 P.2d 285 (1953), the 
Utah Supreme Court analyzed the effect of the presumption and its 
application, as follows: 
"A presumption deals with a rule of law which 
requires the trier of the facts to assume the 
existence of one fact or set of facts (herein 
called the presumed facts) from the establishment 
of another fact or set of facts (herein called 
the basic facts) . Unless the basic facts are 
conclusively shown to exist, that question, if 
material, should be submitted to the jury. The 
existence of the basic facts may or may not have 
a logically tendency to prove the presumed facts, 
also they may have some such logical tendency but 
be insufficient standing alone to justify an 
inference on that question. From the basic fact 
that a human being was accidently killed a 
presumption arises which requires the trier of 
the facts to assume the presumed facts, that 
decedent used due care for his own safety, in the 
absence of a prima facia showing to the contrary, 
but in this kind of a presumption upon the making 
of such showing the presumption disappears from 
and becomes wholly inoperative in the case, and 
the trial from then on should proceed exactly the 
same as through no presumption ever existed or 
had any effect on the case. 
Such a presumption deals only with the 
burden of going forward with or the production of 
evidence. The question of whether a prima facia 
case has been made is the same here as in all 
othe~ cases a question for the court and not for 
the jury to determine. It is established 
whenever sufficient evidence is produced from 
which its existence could be reasonably found. 
It is immaterial which party produces such 
evidence. If the court concludes that a prima 
facia case has been made, it should submit the 
question of the existence of the presumed facts 
to the jury on the evidence without commenting on 
o~ mentioning to them that there was or is such a 
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presumption. If the court concludes that no 
prima facia showing of the nonexistence of the 
presumed facts has been made he should direct the 
jury to assume the existence of the presumed 
facts, or if such facts are determinative of the 
whole case he· should direct a verdict in 
accordance therewith. Such is the effect of this 
kind of a presumption ..•.. " (emphasis added) 262 
P.2d @ 290 
See also DeMille v Erickson, 23 Utah 2d 278, 462 P.2d 159, 161 
(1969). 
The instruction on the presumption should only be given 
when evidence has not been adduced during the trial establishing a 
prima facia case negating the presumed fact. A prima facia case 
". . • is established whenever sufficient 
evidence is produced from which its existence 
(conclusion negating the presumed facts) could be 
reasonably found." 262 P.2d @ 290 
B. There was sufficient evidence adduced during the trial 
establishing a prima f acia case that Evan Pearce was 
contributorily negligent thus negating the presumed fact that he 
used due care. 
The record clearly shows that evidence was adduced during 
trial establishing that Evan Pearce: 
1. Had slept very little during the approximate 
thirty-six (36) hours prior to his death (R. 
543-550); 
2. Was pushing himself physically by water 
skiing beyond reason (R. 344-345,365); 
3. Refused to stop skiing when requested to do 
so by Kevin Wistisen, the operator of the boat, 
notwithstanding the windy conditions (R. 417); 
-11-
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4. Continued to ski though he was fatigued 
(R. 421-423); 
5. Removed his life preserver and started 
swimming toward the boat leaving the jacket and 
skies abandoned in the lake (R. 348-351,115,424); 
6. Failed to adjust the replacement life 
preserver to properly fit his body (R. 411); and 
7. After the boys were stranded, left Kevin 
Wistisen behind during the swim to the West shore 
(R. 426-427). 
It is abundantly clear that one could reasonably conclude 
that Evan Pearce contributed to his own demise thus negating the 
presumed fact that he used due care. Consequently, the Trial 
Court properly denied Appellant's requested Instruction Number 
Six. 
POINT III 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR REGARDING ITS 
INSTRUCTIONS CONCERNING THE REQUIREMENT OF 
AN ANCHOR ABOARD THE BOAT. 
A. Utah statutory law does not require that all boats be 
equipt with an anchor. 
Appellant contends that there is a statutory requirement 
that the boat in question was required to have an anchor aboard at 
the time of the incident. He is in error on this point. 
UCA §73-18-8 (1980) provides: 
"All vessels except those capable of being safely 
beached shall be equipped with an anchor and line 
of sufficient weight and length to securely 
anchor such vessel. (emphasis added) 
See also 4 Utah Admin. R. §A60-01-3(3) (b) (12) (1975). 
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Whether a vessel is required to have an anchor aboard 
depends upon its capability of being safely beached. The safe 
beachability of a boat is a question of fact, not of law. 
Evidence was adduced on both sides of the issue at trial. 
(R. 468, 569) 
For Appellant to argue that the boat in question was 
statutorily required to have an anchor aboard presupposes that 
Appellant's evidence was the only reasonable conclusion to be 
drawn regarding its beachability irrespective of Respondents' 
evidence to the contrary. Such a supposition is without merit. 
B. The Court properly instructed the Jury as to 
Repondents' duty concerning-the proper equipment required to be on 
board the subject boat. 
At trial, Appellant claimed Defendants were negligent in 
two particulars: 
FIRST, because they allegedly violated codified statutory 
and administrative law in failing to have the proper equipment on 
board, to wit: improper number of approved life preservers; no 
oar or paddle; no horn or whistle; no bail bucket; improper 
lightning; no throwable device; and 
SECOND, because they allegedly violated non-codified 
safety standards promolgated by boating experts and recommended by 
the Utah Parks and Recreation Department, to wit: no anchor 
(unless boat incapable of safe beaching) ; no boat hook; no 
-13-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
compass; no distress signals; no flashlight; no first aid kit; no 
heaving line; no spare oars; no ring buoy; etc. (See Appendix A-1 
of Appellants' brief for a complete list of such equipment.) 
The first allegation of negligence if proven would yield a 
finding of negligence on Defendants part as a matter of law, while 
the second allegation, if proven, could only yield a finding of 
negligence if the trier of fact concluded that the alleged 
misconduct violated the reasonable man standard. 
The Courts Instruction Number Six (R. 179), circumscribes 
both allegations. The first paragraph of the instruction defines 
the reasonable man standard (Appellant's second claim for 
negligence) as follows: 
"It is the duty of owners and operators of boats, 
such as the one here involved, to have that boat 
equipped with all safety appliances and devices 
that a reasonable prudent person conversant with 
boating and water skiing would have for the 
protection of the life and safety of users of the 
boat, including a water skier, anticipating 
possible foreseeable emergencies. A violation of 
such duty may be the basis for a determination 
that the person or persons thus violating the 
duty was negligent." 
The second and succeeding paragraphs define the codified laws and 
regulations of Utah regarding boating as follows: 
"Under the laws and regulations of this 
State, an operator of a boat, such as that 
involved herein, is required to have aboard the 
vessel and readily available; 
1. One coastguard approved life preserver 
buoyant vest or special purpose water safety 
buoyant device for each person aboard and of the 
appropriate size for the person wearing it or for 
whom it was intended, plus at least one 
coastguard approved buoyant cushion, ring life 
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buoy, or equivalent, which is 
available as a throwable device. 
immediately 
2. At least one oar or paddle capable of 
being used to maneuver such motorboat when 
necessary. 
3. One horn or whistle which may be 
operated either by mouth, by hand, or by power 
and shall be audible for at least on half mile. 
4. An adequate bail bucket or hand 
operated bilge pump. 
5. While under way, and between sunset 
and sunrise, a thirty two point white light aft, 
and visible for two miles all around, a 
combination bow light showing red to port (left) 
and green to starboard (right) which shai1 be 
visible for one mile from dead ahead to two point 
abaft the beam. 
6. An operator of a boat, such as the 
one here involved, shall require each person who 
is surfing or being towed on water skies or 
similar device to wear a proper fitting 
coastguard approved floatation device. 
7. An operator of a boat, such as the 
one here involved, shall not allow swimming from 
an unanchored vessel, unless there is at least 
one person left aboard who is capable of 
operating it properly. 
A violation of any of 
regulations would be negligence 
law." 
these laws and 
as a matter of 
In both cases, Appellant's theories of negligence were 
given to the jury in the Court's Instruction Number Six. 
Appellant complains that his requested Instruction Number 
Eight was not given. However, to have done so would have been 
redundant in light of the Court's Instruction Number Six. 
Moreover, it would have called more attention to the recommended 
safety standards embodied therein (which were already before the 
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jury as Plaintiff's Exhibit Number Seven) than other evidence 
relevant to the reasonable man standard. 
There was no error in the Courts refusal to give 
Appellant's requested Instruction Number Eight. 
C. Even if it were error not to give Appellant's 
requested Instruction Number Eight, it was not prejudicial and 
thus is not grounds for reversal. 
The Special Verdict found Respondents (including Kevin 
Wistisen, the operator of the boat) negligent (R. 19 3) • 
Consequently, the failure of the Court in giving Appellant's 
requested Instruction Number Eight cannot now be said to have 
prejudiced Appellant because the jury's finding on negligence, as 
to Respondents, was in Appellant's favor. 
Therefore, if error did indeed exist in not giving the 
instruction, under Rule 61, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, it is 
harmless error and not grounds for reversal. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT DID NOT 
TESTIMONY THAT THE 
ALCOHOL DURING THE 
PRECEDING HIS DEATH. 
ERR IN 
DECEDENT 
NIGHT AND 
ALLOWING 
CONSUMED 
MORNING 
Respondants defended Appellant's claim of wrongful death 
at trial in part, upon the ground that Evan Pearce was 
contributorily negligent due to his physical exhaustion caused by 
his own conduct during the approximate thirty-six (36) hours prior 
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to his death (R. 259). Consequently, evidence was adduced 
concerning the fact that he had essentially been without sleep for 
the entire period (R. 546 ,657); had consumed alcohol during the 
middle twelve hours thereof (R. 547-549, 656); was intent upon 
celebrating his high school graduation during the entire period 
(R. 528) and water skied when he was overly tired (R. 353, 421, 
425, 574); all of which contributed to a deteriorated physical 
condition which proximately caused the circumstances resulting in 
his death. 
Appellant claims that the evidence admitted concerning 
alcohol consumption caught him by surprise, was irrelevant, remote 
in time, prejudicial and thus was reversable error. (Appellant's 
Brief, Page 15) 
Rule 4, Utah Rules of Evidence states the standard for the 
alleged erroneous admission of evidence: 
"A verdict or finding shall not be set aside, nor 
shall the judgment or decision based thereon be 
reversed, by reason of the erroneous admission of 
evidence unless (a) there appears of record 
objection to the evidence time~y interposed and 
so stated as to make clear the specific ground of 
objection, and (b) the court which passes upon 
the effect of the error or errors is of the 
opinion that the admitted evidence should have 
been excluded on the ground stated and probably 
had a substantial influence in bringing about the 
verdict or finding. However, the court in its 
discretion, and in the interest of justice, may 
review the erroneous admission of evidence even 
though the grounds of the objection thereto are 
not correctly stated. (emphasis added) 
See also Barnbrough v Bethers, 552 P.2d 1286 (Utah 1976) 
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A reversal should only occur when the grounds are 
specified and the allegedly erroneous evidence probably had a 
substantial influence in bringing about the verdict. 
A. Appellant's claim of surprise: 
Appellant claims surprise concerning the subject testimony 
(R. 262) although he received the information approximately one 
week before trial at the time counsel on both sides exchanged 
witness lists (R. 262). Notwithstanding, the Court offered to 
continue the trial and allow Appellant's counsel leave to depos~ 
Rod Hunt, the witness from whom the alcohol testimony was to be 
elicited. Appellant's counsel refused the continuance and 
requested that the trial proceed. (R. 262-265) Appellant cannot 
now properly claim prejudice due to surprise. 
REASONS: 
B. Appellant's claim of irrelevancy: 
For evidence to be relevant, it must have: 
". • . some tendency to establish the ultimate 
point for which the evidence is offered." 
Poulin v. Zurtman, 542 P.2d 251, 260(Alaska 1975) 
The evidence was properly admitted at trial for TWO 
FIRST, notwithstanding the discussion of counsel with the 
Court in chambers prior to trial concerning the issue (R. 253-266). 
Appellant's counsel raised the subject of Evans's condition before 
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the jury fir~t (R. 489,528l Consequently, Respondents therefore 
had the right to introduce evidence concerning the matter by way 
of rebuttal. 
SECOND, and more important, is the fact that the evidence 
of alcohol as presented by Respondents, directly related to 
Respondents' theory of contributory negligence, i.e. physical 
exhaustion: Respondants were not trying to prove the decedent was 
intoxicated, or even under the influence at the time of death; 
but, rather, the evidence was admitted to show that the drinking 
had occurred during the night and morning hours proceeding death 
which Respondents allege contributed to decedents deterioated 
physical . condition during the emergency and subsequent events. 
The premise upon which the evidence was given to the jury was that 
a persons normal knowledge, experience and understanding of life 
is sufficient to allow him/her to know that the commonly ref erred 
to "hang over" which usually follows ones consumption of alcohol 
results in a loss of physical efficiency. 
The evidence was relevant to the issue as described. In 
Bach v Penn Central Transportation Co., 502 F.2d 1117 (6th Cir. 
1974) the Court stated the general rule: 
"Clearly, testimony tending to show that the 
decedent had been drinking before a fatal 
accident is generally relevant to the jury's 
consideration of contributory negligence." 502 
F.2d @ 1121 
c. Appellant's claim as to remotness in time. 
Appellant claims that the evidence regarding the time of 
conJiumption rs su remote from the occurance that it has no 
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probative value. Bach v Penn Central Transporation Co., Id. is 
the authority relied upon for that proposition. (See Appellant's 
Brief at Page 19) 
However, in Bach, the fatality occurred Saturday afternoon 
and the alleged drinking spree occurred the preceeding Thursday 
evening, some forty to forty-eight hours earlier. Bach @ 1121 In 
the instant case, the alleged drinking by the decedent occurred 
the night preceeding the incident (R. 294,404), some twelve hours 
prior and during the early morning hours on the day of the 
incident (R. 548), some eight to ten hours prior. 
Common experience justifies the jury being allowed to 
consider the effect consumption of alcohol may have on one's 
physical condition when the consumption is that proximate in point 
of time. 
D. Appellant's claim of prejudice. 
Appellent claims error because the Trial Court admitted 
the alcohol testimony on grounds that its probative value did not 
outweigh its prejudical value. 
The balancing of these two competing issues is left to the 
Courts discretion, Rule 4, Utah Rules of Evidence, which is broad 
in measure and should only be reversed if it is abused. Martin v 
Safeway Store, Inc., 565 P.2d 1139, 1141 (Utah 1977). 
The Court felt the alcohol testimony did go to the issue 
of physical exhaustion. During the chamber conference prior to 
trial the following dialogue occurred: 
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"MR. HANSEN: I represent Wistisen and 
Oveson, and Wistisen with his son Kevin has been 
living in Washington, so I have not had access to 
them; therefore I was slow getting to Rod Hunt. 
I might indicate that part of our defense in this 
case is that this boy drowned because he had been 
up for thirty-six hours, he was physically 
exhausted, his conduct the night before 
aggravated his physical exhaustion, there had 
been no sleep, he had had alcohol, he had some 
drugs, namely speed and marijuana, and it just 
seems to me that has probative value in this 
case. At least it ought to go to jury, even 
though we don't have scientific evidence from 
someone on quantity and say as of 4:30 he would 
have had this much in his system, as of 5:30 and 
6:30 he would have had this much in his system. 
The body itself was not recovered until eight 
days later, and you can't take a test of a body 
at that time, a blood-alcohol test, and have it 
do you any good. · 
THE COURT: Doesn't it run, Mr. Howard, 
to the question of his state of exhaustion when 
this episode occurred? 
MR. HOWARD: I don't think so, Your 
Honor. I don't have any objection to him 
testifying that they had had a party that night 
and he didn't get very much sleep, but I do 
object to this fellow coming in who has a -- I 
haven't had any opportunity to take his 
deposition. 
THE COURT: Do you want it? 
MR. HOWARD: It's a complete surprise to 
me. 
THE COURT: Do you want it? 
MR. HOWARD: I don't want it at this 
stage. I am ready for trial. 
THE COURT: Pardon? 
MR. HOWARD: I am ready for trial." 
(R. 259-260) 
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Notwithstanding the Courts feeling that the testimony was 
proper, he offered counsel a continuance so he could depose Rod 
Hunt prior to trial, (R. 269). However, counsel refused the 
continuance and demanded that the Court immediately proceed with 
trial (R. 264) 
There cannot now be a successful claim for prejudice made 
by Appellant because he waived the offer to correct the alleged 
error (if indeed there was one) by refusing the continuance for 
deposition purposes thereby denying himself opportunity to check 
the testimony in question or to prepare rebuttal testimony in 
opposition. 
E. Even if the admission of the testimony concerning 
alcohol was error, it was not substantial and thus is not grounds 
for reversal. 
The jury found both the decedent (Evan Pearce) and 
Respondants negligent. (R. 193) However, it further found that 
only the negligence of the decedent proximately caused his demise 
and that Respondents' negligence did not proximately cause 
decedent's death. (R. 193) Consequently, the issue as to the 
percentage of negligence between the parties was never reached by 
the jury. 
Therefore, the holding in Bach v Penn Central 
Transportation Co., 502 F.2d 1117 (6th Cir. 1974) as quoted on 
Pages 19 and 20 of Appellant's Brief concerning the allocation of 
negligence in a comparative negligence case is not aDPlicable 
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here. In Bach the jury found causation on both parties, where in 
the instant case causation was attributable only to the decedent. • 
Since there is ample evidence to support the jury's 
findings on both the negligence and the causation issues, without 
the alcohol testimony, it follows that it cannnot now be claimed 
that had the alcohol testimony been excluded, the result may have 
been different. Consequently the alleged error in admitting the 
testimony was not substantial and is not grounds for reversal. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant's claims for error concerning instructions are 
not a basis for reversal because: 
1 . Vicarious liabili tv: The instructions given by the 
Court implicity instructed the jury of the doctrine of vicarious 
liability; and even if they did not, the alleged error did not 
prejudice Appellant because the jury found in Appellant's favor on 
the negligence issue; and 
' 2. Presumption: The Court's refusal to give the 
· instruction that the decedent used due care at the time of his 
death was proper because the evidence adduced at trial established 
a prima facia case that he had not used due care; and 
3. Anchor: The instructions given by the Court properly 
informed the jury concerning any anchor requirements regarding the 
subject boat as . that issue related to Respondents' negligence; 
but, even if they did not, Appellant's were not prejudiced because 
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the jury found in Appellant's favor on the issue of negligence to 
which the anchor matter applied. 
The Court did not err in allowing testimony regarding Evan 
Pearce's consumption of acohol a short period of time prior to the 
incident because it was relevant and had probative value. 
Moreover, even if it were error, it was not substantial in that 
the jury found against Appellant on the issue of causation and 
there was substantial testimony in support of that finding without 
the testimony of the acohol consumption. 
Consequently, the Trial Court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this ~ 
C. HAN N 
Attorney for Respondents 
110 West Center Street 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
(801) 295-2391 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
Mailed two copies of the foregoing Brief of Respondents to 
Mr. Jackson Howard, attorney for Appellants, 123 East 300 North, 
P.O. Box 778, Provo, Utah 84601, postage prepaid, this ~ay 
of August, 1982. 
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